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that what he has attributed to this method has been due much more to personal influence. That his success has been due to the method, I should almost dare to deny with confidence. This method is based upon an assumption that is radically and completely erroneous. The assumption is that the process of divining the sense of a Latin sentence is an inductive and self-conscious one. It is often neither, and the opposite habit of mind, of trying to see the meaning directly without the intervention of self-conscious logic, is on all accounts to be cultivated.

I am well aware that I have done no more than clear the ground, if I have done as much, for the discussion of the question, but to occupy more of your time would be inexcusable, when one so abundantly qualified to treat the question exhaustively is to follow me; I mean the senior professor of Latin in this university

Roxbury Latin School

William C. Collar

HELLENIC EDUCATION—(Concluded)

THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF THE FEW IN THE 5TH CENTURY B. C. AND THEREAFTER

We have seen that the Athenian youth and boy had, so far as school instruction, primary, secondary, or higher was concerned, an easy time of it up to the middle of the 5th century B. C. And as historians of education, we have to note the fact that Greece was within sight of the highest pinnacle of its fame in arts and arms before school instruction took a more serious form. In Epic, Elegiac, Lyric, and Tragic Dramatic Poetry, all the greatest work had been done before 450 B. C., and in the subsequent 50 years philosophy, history, and even oratory and comedy had given almost all their greatest examples to the world.

From, let us say, 460 B. C., we can detect the beginnings of what we call the "higher" education, and this has of course to be connected with the life of the ephebi. But first we have to consider the historical situation.

As Athens and the other active Hellenic centres progressed in material civilization and in democratic forms of government, the number of young men of the leisured classes who desired an outlet for their activity in political life and were ready to interest themselves in all sorts of questions, largely increased. Improved facilities of communication among Greek states and the multiplication of political and colonial relations contributed also to the enhancement of public life, especially after the Persian wars, which ended 479 B. C. We had now the beginnings of what is called the Athenian Empire. It seemed to have been instinctively felt that the chances of success in public life, now so much enlarged and so much more exacting, demanded more intellectual preparation than heretofore. The schools of abstract philosophy had as yet engaged the attention of only a select few, and, moreover, did not meet the practical wants of the time.

When we consider the cosmopolitan view of life and politics forced on the Greeks by their warlike encounters with both east and west and the wide ramification of their commercial relations, the rise of a spirit of inquiry, and of criticism of existing institutions, and of their basis in reason as well as mere custom, was not surprising. The new intellectual movement sought for satisfaction. And this, quite apart from the growing conviction that, with the increased importance of the democracy came a demand on those who would succeed in political life to study both politics and oratory.

Cotemporaneously with the rise of this new intellectual and political movement, there arose in the Hellenic states teachers who professed to give all the instruction needed for guidance in public life. These men (called Sophists, the chief of whom were Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus,) taking up their quarters first in one town and then in another, offered their intel-

lectual wares for sale, and thus incurred the contempt of the pure philosophers who held that wisdom was to be neither bought nor sold.

The "higher" education arose from the causes indicated above, and coincided with the rise of itinerant public teachers who professed to be scientific, as well as practical, in the instructions they gave. They met the critical, the political, and rhetorical demands of the time. The leading Sophists had unquestionably studied the systems of philosophy which had come down to them ; but the abstract speculative interest seemed to yield little that told on the immediate human interest. They accordingly offered to their eager pupils a kind of philosophy of practical life, superficial it might be, but still having intelligible relations to the world of political activity on which they were entering with all the ardent ambition of youth. Along with this, they also gave scientific instruction in all the knowledge of the time. The more aspiring young men of the upper classes now sought for these instructors because they professed to give, and did, as a matter of fact, give, a rational view of life in all its relations which could be turned to immediate use. They obtained all they wanted from the grammatical, physical, and moral discussions of the peripatetic lecturers, but above all from their definite political instruction and their art of Rhetoric.

Rhetoric now became a theory as well as an art, and in the course of time unfolded itself as a system so detailed and so encumbered with technical details as to be, to the modern mind, intolerable. Still, with all its superficiality and defects and formalism, the teaching of the sophists supplied a want and gave the only higher education which then existed, or was, perhaps, then practicable. That the name "Sophist" did not, as time went on and as rhetorical theory was dignified by the more earnest treatment of Isocrates call forth contempt, is evident from the fact that the designation became almost universally applied to the higher teachers whether they included philosophy in their course or confined themselves, as was the general rule, to superficial science and a practical oratory.

The four philosophical schools which in the 4th century held the tradition of earnest, scientific inquiry for the sake of truth alone, (the Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean,) gave a profounder discipline: but the youth of the country, down even to the close of classical antiquity, unquestionably regarded rhetoric and oratory as the main end of all their studies, to which philosophy was only contributory.

The outcome of the whole was, that in the 4th century the higher or "university" education comprised for those who desired it, philosophy, which took a wide range, as well as politics and rhetoric. For the few so disposed, there were mathematics and astronomy. The higher education continued to maintain this character (speaking generally,) till 300 A. D.

I have said above that the higher education now introduced connected itself closely with the ephebi and their rules of life. They were not always on military duty, and as their athletics were carried on in the Gymnasia where philosophers and sophists were in the habit of lecturing and teaching, it became the custom with many of the young men to attend their prelections. Isocrates had many such in his specially organized school. But in the preceding generation it had already become a recognized custom for young men in the intervals of their ephebic training, and after it was concluded, to attend one or more teachers of philosophy and politics and rhetoric.

The *military* duties of the ephebi were reduced to one year about the time of Philip of Macedon, and, ere long, ephebic service became altogether voluntary. It would appear that the youths were now officially expected, if not required to attend the schools, so that the ephebic period became virtually connected with what we should call a "university" period. Even then, however, all intellectual pursuits gathered round Gymnastic. So that we have this interesting result, that the military and gymnastic training of men above 18 absorbed into itself what we should in these days call university education—at least in so far as opportunity went—just as the Gymnasia themselves became the university headquarters. "We com-

mit our youth," says Lucian, speaking in the second century A. D., "to certain good and approved masters, who are called sophists or philosophers, (the designation sophist was frequently used instead of philosopher in Lucian's time, 200 years A. D.) by whom they are taught both to say and to do what is right and just, to attend to and assist the common weal, to live honestly, never to seek after what is base and unworthy, or to commit violence on any man." (Anach.) The advanced instruction was thus ethical and political, in so far as it was not purely rhetorical. Lucian is speaking, doubtless, in the Romano-Hellenic period. But even so late as his time there was no organization of a course of higher or university instruction: all was voluntary—free learning and free teaching. During the period which chiefly concerns the historian of Athenian education, the 5th to the 3d century B. C., this was still more true. We find in what I have said above, however, the origination and gradual recognition of the need for higher instruction: and this is of supreme interest to the historian of the evolution of education.

It was in the school of Isocrates (393–338) that we have combined the best results of the higher educational activity of the 4th century. It would be hard to say whether, with Isocrates, rhetoric comprehended philosophy or philosophy rhetoric. The aim was to make a thoughtful man and a capable citizen; but a capable citizen was one who could write and *speak*, and so influence his fellow-citizens to wise courses. The educational question which Isocrates tried to solve was "By what intellectual preparation can this be best attained?" His popularity and fame all the world recognizes. As Cicero says in *Brutus* 32: "Isocrates cujus domus cunctæ Graeciæ quasi ludus quidam patuit atque officina dicendi." Plato, in the *Phaedrus*, puts him above all the other teachers of oratory "because he has philosophy in him."

Isocrates, however, was not a philosopher in the Platonic or Aristotelian sense; but rather a man who, recognizing rhetoric as the greatest of studies, because by means of it one might

persuade men to wise political action and to a noble personal life, philosophised this great art. He always kept in view its ethical and political relations. The Athenians were naturally an eloquent people, and it was to be expected that they would study eloquence and that it should occupy a supreme place in the higher education. Isocrates at once represented and satisfied the national need. He honestly attached supreme importance to style as the servant of justice and virtue—being apparently persuaded that *true* eloquence must always be the reflection of a virtuous and wise mind.* Eloquence, he held, has for its aim the development of great truths and is the chief agent in civilization. And although he saw, all round him, to his deep regret, this same eloquence used to tickle the ears of the populace or to advance personal interests or unworthy causes, it did not seem to occur to him that a higher education founded on rhetoric alone must be doomed to failure. In his view the best form and the best thought were indissolubly allied. Art in speech was the greatest of arts. In training to this all the faculties, intellectual and moral, were trained. Assuming a good preliminary secondary education, he rested the whole higher education thereafter on language as an instrument of thought and expression. His pupils spent two or three years under his tuition. We must therefore, I think, look upon this organized school of Isocrates as the mother-university of Europe.

The death of Isocrates did not affect the position of Athens as the world centre of all intellectual activity. The ambitious well-to-do youth of the Mediterranean flocked to Athens to receive their final preparation for life. And this not in the schools of rhetoric alone,—for side by side with the rhetorical schools arose the great schools of Philosophy, Platonic, Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean, as *organized systems*, each with its teachers and devotees; and in these the more thoughtful found satisfaction for their philosophical aspirations.

The sophistic and philosophical movements told, as might

* See especially Paul Girard and Quintilian.

have been expected, on the lower schools. Grammar, drawing, and geometry had been gradually introduced ; and thus a formal element was added to the purely literary and musical in the education of the young—especially of those who frequented school longer than others. Geography, too, found a place in the school curriculum—almost a necessity among a maritime race like the Greeks. Thus the secondary school-curriculum was completed ; but for centuries, down, indeed, till the overthrow of the Roman Empire, it was only a good secondary school which could boast of embracing so many subjects.

The result of Hellenic thought on the education of the man was ultimately summed up on the line of Plato's conceptions, supplemented by Aristotle. And it was this : In the secondary school grammar, literature, music, drawing, geography, arithmetic, and geometry ; in the higher studies, music, arithmetic, (both scientifically treated,) geometry, and astronomy—all these, according to Plato, leading to the supreme study, Dialectic in the sense of philosophy. In the centuries after the birth of Christ, rhetoric and dialectic were regarded as constituting, with grammar, a propædæutic to the higher physical studies. But only in their elements. Together they constituted the trivium, the higher studies constituting the quadrivium. These names, however, were not in use till the 5th century. All through the middle ages the seven studies taken together constituted the liberal arts. It was in the 5th century that philosophy in the Platonic and Aristotelian sense vanished from view, and that the preparatory arts became barren and restricted in their scope. Up to this date educational terms were elastic and varied in their meaning. With Quintilian, for example, dialectic meant logic, physics, and ethics, while physics included the study of the *ratio mundi*, and thus had a universal and philosophical character. The memorial verses which summed up the course of a liberal education in the middle ages after learning began to revive are well known :

“Lingua, Tropus, Ratio, Numerus, Tenor, Angulus, Astra.”

Also expressed in the couplet :

Gramm: loquitur, Dia. vera docet, Rhe. verba colorat,
Mus. canit, Ar. numerat, Geo. ponderat, As. colit astra.

But we here anticipate. To return: It was to the philosophic schools to which I have above referred, that Athens continued to owe its true fame and influence more than to the schools of the rhetoricians. The philosophers pursued truth for its own sake. They represented the scientific spirit. Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Zeno, all had their successors. The connection of these philosophical schools with certain localities in Athens has been briefly and clearly stated by Professor Mahaffy, as follows :*

He says "There were two *gymnasia* (in the Greek sense,) provided for the youth who had finished their schooling—that in the groves of the suburb called after the hero Academus, and that called the Kynosarges, near Mount Lycabettus. The latter was specially open to the sons of citizens by foreign wives. Thirdly, in Pericles' day was established the Lykeion, near the river Ilisos. They were all provided with water, shady walks and gardens, and were once among the main beauties of Athens and its neighbourhood. The academy became so identified with Plato's teaching, that his pupils Antisthenes (the Cynic,) and Aristotle settled beside, or in, the Kynosarges and Lykeion respectively and were known by their locality, till the pupils of Antisthenes removed to the frescoed portico (stoa,) in Athens, and were thence called Stoics. Epicurus taught in his own garden in Athens. All these settlements were copied from Plato's idea. He apparently taught both in the public gymnasium, and in a private possession close beside it; and in his will, preserved by Diogenes Laertius, he bequeaths his two pieces of land to Speusippus, thus designating him as his formal successor. His practice being followed, the title *scholarch* soon grew up for the head of the school and the owner of a life interest in the locality devoted to the purpose. Each master was called the *successor* (Diadochus) of his predecessor, and the succession of these heads of schools has been

*Old Greek Education, p. 136.

traced, with more or less success through all the Hellenistic period." I think even down to the 5th century A. D.

While it is true that it was to the philosophic teaching that Athens owed its greatness, it is also true that as a consequence of the great importance assigned to oratory and to style generally, the higher education was always tending to degenerate into the study of rhetoric alone. A short road to oratory was the desire of young men, and they more and more tended to flock chiefly round the rhetoricians. The next stage of degeneracy was inevitable. From the moment linguistic art and mere style and oratorical effect become the professed object of study, education became divorced from reality. A man like Isocrates could maintain a living connexion, but we cannot imperil education on the expectation of an apostolic succession of men of genius. With the ordinary teacher degeneracy is certain, if we do not hold high the scientific aim of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, living for the sake of life. Form becomes all in all. Not *what* is said, but *how* it is said, becomes the standard of culture. Education becomes artificial. Art for art's sake passes into artifice. The mind wastes its powers over words and niceties of phrase and composition. Originality gives place to imitation. Severe discipline in language, grammar and logic is lost sight of, and technical forms are got up as if one could be eloquent by rule. Thus rhetoric itself misses its aim—eloquence. The severe, manly, simple and logical development of a theme in the interests of truth gives place to a weak and insipid but fluent loquacity, not intended to enforce truth, or to guide to sound judgment, but merely to tickle the popular ear and to gratify the vanity or gain the temporary ends of the speaker. Living oratory disappears. Brilliant language, rhythmical sound, sharp antitheses, metaphors, images and playing on words had become, even before the Christian era, objects of unfeigned admiration to the youth of the eastern Mediterranean.

It is usual to speak with a certain sentimental regret of the early decadence of the Athenian higher schools. I can find no

ground for holding that they suffered from actual decay till, perhaps, 200 or 250 years after the birth of Christ. Their weakness lay in the commercial rivalry of its teachers and the growing devotion to mere rhetoric. Assuredly, from 430 B. C. to about 300 A. D., Athens, spite of the rise of many rivals, remained the chief intellectual centre of the civilized world. Thus for 700 years at least, spite of its great Alexandrian rival, it governed the higher education of the civilized world. Nor was this education always of so degenerate a kind as satirists would make us believe. A young man repairing to Athens had still the best opportunities that had ever existed of discussing the profound questions of philosophy and science, as well as of going through an extensive literary and grammatical course under some approved rhetorician, while entering into friendly student relations with youths from all parts of the Roman Empire. What better university education can we offer now, if the education of young men means the stimulation of intellectual activity in the search for truth, or in the attainment of professional excellence? It is true that many who flocked to Athens and the other university centres of Rhodes, Pergamon, &c., often idled their time, and that not a few were content with a very superficial culture, fitting for mere oratorical display. But may we not, *mutatis mutandis*, make the same remark now of every university in Europe?

After all is said that can be said on Hellenic education, I return to my original proposition, viz.: that the Hellenic educational idea, more or less conscious, always was *Sophrosyne*, (self-control, balance, limitation,) *Arete*, or excellence, and *Eukosmia*, or grace and becomingness of bearing and expression. That the Greeks did not wholly succeed in attaining to this harmonious result is only another way of saying that they were human beings. None the less was the tendency always in the direction summed up by these three words. They had an ideal of a man, and to this he ought to be educated. The whole of life, indeed, was governed too much by the idea of the beautiful—the artistic con-

ception of human life. Hence its charm, its freedom, its want of reverence, and its saucy independence; hence, too, its failure to attain, in the case of the great mass even of educated men, to the deeper moral insight of a sense of moral law* waiting on all the acts and aims of mortals and relegating all else to a subordinate place. Personal truthfulness, personal purity, and a sense of overawing duty were not to be found in the average citizen, except where an attempt had been made, as in Sparta, to enforce them as part of the state-system of life—an artificial attempt at best. We have in the Greek, I think, a pure exhibition of the finite and aesthetic side of human nature in its most charming and seductive forms. It could not endure; it is not to be imitated, save and in so far as it represents one side of human endeavor. Only where law and duty are supreme, where truth and reality take precedence of form, and these three, Law, Duty, and Truth, are recognized as the Divine order and the inexorable command, can man attain to the fullness of his own personality, and mould an ideal state composed of citizens harmoniously educated. In the Roman we find some glimpses of this fresh aspect of the problem of national life and to him we shall now turn. But before doing so let me add a few words on Plato and Aristotle.

NOTE ON PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

The history of education is one thing and the theoretical views of philosophers another. And were it not that both Plato and Aristotle in what they say really speak in a Greek *national* sense, and are not merely theorizers but representative spokesmen, I would simply name them and pass on to the consideration of Roman life and education. As it is, I shall be brief.

I. PLATO; (died 348 B. C.)

The following short summing up of the chief characteristics of Plato's educational scheme I had intended to re-write and make much fuller. But meanwhile I read Nettleship's exposition and criticism of the Republic in the Oxford volume entitled "*Hellenica*." It seems to me almost an impertinence to write on the subject after so admirable an essay is before the world. Accordingly, I confine myself to that brief and somewhat external view of the Platonic argument which I had originally written.†

*I am speaking of the Hellenic race, not of individual dramatists or philosophers.

†To obviate superfluous criticism I wish to say that it is so long since I read the Republic and wrote what follows for my class that I am quite unable to say whether I owe it to some other writer.

In the beginning B. V. of the Republic, Plato says, "Such then is the state or constitution which I call good and right, and such is the good man." This sentence is the key to the Republic. Plato constructs a perfect state that he may at the same time construct his idea of a perfect man, and *vice versa*. The one is the parallel or counterpart of the other. He depicts a just state that he may exhibit a just man, and a just man that he may exhibit a just state.

What is this "just" condition of mind? To answer this we must note that there are three principles, according to Plato, active in the mind of man. The rational, the spirited, the concupiscent, (i. e., desire generally.) Now the just man is he who having by reason gained the mastery over himself so regulates his own character that the three principles work in harmony—(as if they were verily three chords of a harmony, higher, lower, and middle). He is a duly harmonized man. This as the natural harmony of nature, is *Justice*.

The education of a human being to the ideal height of the just man, is itself subordinated to the idea of the perfect or just *State*. The man is to be trained for the State—that it may be a well-organized unity, just as the man himself is a harmonized unity of reason, spirit, and desire.

To attain this end in the individual *first*, and through him in the State, the two elements of education are necessary, viz., Gymnastic and Music. The former has for its object a harmonious well-developed body: but this is not as you commonly see stated, the end of gymnastic. The end of music is mental culture and moderation; and the end of gymnastic is also mental. This comes out clearly enough in the third book. Without music the man devoted to gymnastic, though doubtless brave and vigorous, is apt to be rough and coarse and to take no interest in rational pursuits, to have no intellectual tastes. The man devoted to music again, to the exclusion of gymnastic, is apt to become over-sensitive, and soft and enfeebled. There is in truth a want of a due proportion of the *spirited* element in him. Gymnastic then has for education a distinct *mental* destination; and in so far as it is mere bodily athletics and no more, it is not a worthy object of pursuit. Both gymnastic and music, I repeat, have value in relation to the mind of man; and Plato himself says, "Whosoever can best blend gymnastic with music and bring *both* to bear on the mind most judiciously, such a man we shall justly call perfect in music and a master of true harmony." III. 412.

Education, says Plato, is the most eminent of all arts. Without it a man would be the worst of wild beasts, and yet see what he is,—and all by education,—the animal which comes nearest to the Godhead.

Note this, that in his conception of the end of education "*The Just*," Plato introduces, in my opinion, a new idea into the life of Greece; or rather he moralizes the idea of the beautiful and harmonious, by adding to the conception of harmonious balance the giving to all parts their due. So potent with him are the Greek ideas of what constituted the beautiful, (in character,) viz.: Sophrosyne, and Arete, and Eukosmia, and of the *State* as supreme over the individual, that he cannot be said to do more than rationalize, (so to speak,) and philosophise the already recognized educational ideas of the Spartans.

With the true eye of a philosopher he tries to penetrate into this idea of the beautiful *to Kalon* in its bearing on human character and finds its true interpretation to be an ethical interpretation, and the word and thought by which it is best expressed to be "Justice," in other words, mental harmony or balance: Justice, which to the whole nature stood in the same relation as Sophrosyne did to feeling and passion.

As regards this end, then, Plato has, it seems to me, simply raised to a higher level and rationalized the Hellenic idea especially in its Doric form; and further in the two great instruments of education he accepts the Hellenic tradition, viz.:

GYMNASTIC AND MUSIC.

In his conception of the end of education, Plato is truly more Spartan than Attic, more Dorian than Ionic. Individual licence in the State, and irregularities, *i. e.*, absence of a just relation of the parts of the soul of man, are alike denounced and kept under the restraining eye of authority, which has its commission from reason. But in the application of the instruments of education he allows his Athenian up-bringing, and rightly, also his philosophy to enter; and here he places, for the first time consciously, before the Greeks themselves, what the true ends of both gymnastic and music respectively were, viz., the production of the just man and, through him of the just state. Gymnastic, as we have seen, has a distinct moral end; while music, again, is not limited, as with the Dorians, to the art of playing and singing, and the chanting of sacred songs and national ballads. He would also largely mitigate the Spartan severity of training, while taking many ideas from it. He interprets, in a new and higher sense, music as meaning a mental cultivation which embraced not merely the ordinary elements, but in addition to these, intellectual discipline of a wide range, viz., arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, the science of harmonics and dialectic. The last included (with Plato,) logic, metaphysics, and the principles and ideas of ethics and religion. There was thus propounded a wide range of study, and first in the Alexandrian schools, and long into the middle ages—nay, down to the reformation—it formed, with the addition of grammar and rhetoric, the highest conception of an educational curriculum. (Trivium and Quadrivium.)

The details of Plato's educational system I shall here give only in a very brief and cursory way.

In the first three years of a child's life, Plato thinks that not only should great care be taken of the body, but also of the impressions made on the mind—avoiding the terrible, frightful, or in any way violently exciting.

From the third year to the sixth, music is to take precedence of gymnastic; and by music, at this stage, is meant fables and narratives which should be repeated to children, but should carefully exclude all false representations of things or such as would give children a wrong notion of the gods. Boys and girls should play freely together at such games as occur to them; and while there should be no pampering, at the same time there should be no severity in punishment. Moral training is a matter, at this stage, of mere authority, and is

dependent on the moral influence of the teachers. Blows are to be permitted only for want of respect to age, or for the deliberate breach of a rule. A feeling of shame and horror is, even at this early stage, to be inculcated.

At the beginning of the seventh year, the two sexes should be separated, and the education of both should include both gymnastic and music. As to the boys, gymnastic is *mainly* to occupy them till their fifteenth year—running, jumping, wrestling, dancing, etc. But we are always to keep in view the ulterior object—which is not to make athletes, but well-developed, self-controlled natures; and the exercises should therefore be not for the development of strength so much as for the heightening of the spirit.

In their eighth year, the young should begin music, *i. e.*, learning to read and write. Plato considers evidently that there may be a good deal of valuable exercise of the understanding in learning to read properly. The poets which children are allowed to study should be such as represent things *truly*, and are morally unexceptionable. He objects to Homer and the Dramas.

It is in the fourteenth year that more thorough music-teaching enters. And here it is music in the narrower sense. Boys should be taught to play on musical instruments and to accompany themselves with the voice. Also to sing together. By dance and song a harmonious and beautiful development of body and mind is promoted.

As to other knowledge, it is not desirable that it should be discursive and encyclopaedic. The state receives more hurt from shallow knowledge than from ignorance. The studies Plato recommends to be begun at this age and carried on till manhood are arithmetic, geometry, astronomy—all leading up to the study of dialectic, which crowns the whole. Dialectic or philosophy occupies the later years. In this way, by due attention to gymnastic and music, we shall produce the self-controlled man who, as being himself harmonious or “just,” will best contribute to the existence and stability of a harmonious or just state, and himself grow like God. The three conceptions which some lectures back I distinguished as lying at the basis of all Greek life and education, again show their faces in the final Platonic exposition, viz: *Arete*, *Sophrosyne*, *Eukosmia*—but with a difference; for they are now more fully defined. Reason is placed as the dominating force: it alone makes justice as a harmony possible. The supreme importance of true moral and religious conceptions as motives of conduct—themselves the fruit of reason in its highest exercise—are brought prominently forward. In brief, the Good takes the place of the Beautiful—comprehending the latter in its definition.

2. ARISTOTLE. (Pupil of Plato, died 322 B. C.)

I mean to allow Aristotle to speak for himself. Plato is at once too elaborate and comprehensive to be presented otherwise than in a summary. To elicit all that is in Aristotle's ethics and politics, in so far as they bear on education, would be a work of considerable labor and I do not attempt it.

GENERAL.

“What we have to aim at is the happiness of each citizen, and happiness consists in a complete activity and practice of virtue.” *Politics*, IV:13.

Aristotle refers his reader to the ethics for this conclusion, and thus shows that with him education as a subject had a scientific basis in ethical philosophy.

"It is right that the citizens should possess a capacity for affairs and for war, but still more for the enjoyment of peace or leisure. (IV:14.) Right that they should be capable of such actions as are indispensable and salutary, but still more of such as are moral *per se*. It is with a view to these objects, then, that they should be educated while they are still children, and at all other ages till they pass beyond the need of education."

The soul consists of two parts—reason in itself, and the lower nature which is capable of receiving the rule of reason. This we find in the *De Anima*; but it is assumed in the educational discussion. In educating, we have to train the habits so as to secure the supremacy of reason.

Up to the age of five it is not desirable to make children apply themselves to study of any kind, or to compulsory bodily exercises, for fear of injuring their growth. They should be allowed only so much movement as not to fall into a sluggish habit of body. Their amusements should not be of too laborious a sort, nor yet effeminate.

Great care should be taken as to the associates of children, and that all coarseness and foul language be far removed from them, as light talking about foul things is closely followed by doing them.

Education, in the strict sense, begins at seven and may be divided into two periods, 7 to 14 and 14 to 21.

(B. V. C. 1.) Education should be regulated by the State for the ends of the State, and each citizen should understand that he is not his own master, but a part of the State.

Also, in the same place, he says: "As the end proposed to the State as a whole is one, it is clear that the education of all the citizens must be one and the same, and the superintendence of it a public affair rather than in private hands."

SUBJECTS OF STUDY.

Note: We must bear in mind that Aristotle, like other Greeks, relegated all mechanical occupations to slaves who were not citizens.

(B. V. 2, of Politics.) "That such useful studies as are absolutely indispensable ought to be taught is plain enough; not all useful studies, however, for in face of the distinction which exists between liberal and illiberal occupations, it is evident that our youth should not be allowed to engage in any but such as being practically useful will, at the same time, not reduce one who engages in them to the level of a mere mechanic. It may be observed that any occupation, or art, or study deserves to be regarded as mechanical if it renders the body, or soul, or intellect of free persons unfit for the exercise or practice of virtue." * * *

"It is the *object* of any action or study which is all-important. There may be nothing illiberal in them if undertaken for one's own sake, or the sake of one's friends, or the attainment of virtue; whereas, the very same action, if done to satisfy others, would in many cases bear a menial or slavish aspect.

"The studies established at the present day are, as has been already remarked, of an ambiguous character. We may say that there are four usual subjects of education, viz. : reading, writing, gymnastic, music; and further—although this is not universally admitted—the art of design. Reading and writing and the art of design are taught for their serviceableness in the purposes of life and their various utility, gymnastic as tending to the promotion of valor; but the purpose of music is involved in great uncertainty. (B. V. 2.) * * *

MUSIC:—THE RELATION OF MUSIC TO LEISURE. ITS LIMITS AS A SUBJECT OF EDUCATION.

Leisure and the noble employment of leisure is the end of human existence, according to Aristotle.

"There is no consensus of opinion as to the definition of this pleasure, (leisure); each individual is guided by his own personality and habit of mind, and he is the perfect man whose pleasure is perfect and derived from the noblest sources.

"It is evident, then, *from our consideration of business and leisure*, that there are certain things in which instruction and education are necessary with a view to leisure, and that these branches of education and study are ends in themselves, while such as have business for their object are pursued only as being indispensable and as leading to some ulterior object. Accordingly music was introduced into the educational system by our forefathers, not as indispensable—it had no such characteristic—nor as practically useful, in the sense in which reading and writing are useful for pecuniary transactions, domestic economy, scientific study, and a variety of political actions; or, as the art of design is in the general opinion, useful as a means of forming a better judgment of works of art; nor, again, as useful, like gymnastic, in promoting health and vigor. Neither of these two results do we find to be produced by music. It remains, therefore, that music is useful for the rational enjoyment of leisure; and this is evidently the purpose to which it was in fact applied by our forefathers, as it is ranked by them as an element of the rational enjoyment which is considered to be appropriate to free persons." (B. V. 3.)

Music, like drawing, is to be followed as a liberal and not as professional study. Enough should be learned to enable all to enjoy what others do; and for this a certain amount of practical acquaintance with both music and drawing is necessary.

GYMNASTIC AND ITS LIMITS.

"As it is evident that the education of the habits must precede that of the reason, and the education of the body must precede that of the intellect, it clearly follows that we must surrender our children *in the first instance* to gymnastic and the art of the trainer, as the latter imparts a certain character to their physical condition, and the former to the feats they can perform."

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"The duty, then, of employing gymnastic and the method of its employ-

ment are admitted. Up to the age of puberty gymnastic exercises of a comparatively light kind should be applied, with a prohibition of hard diet and compulsory exercises, so that there may be no impediment to the growth. The fact that these may have the effect of hindering growth may be clearly inferred from the circumstance that in the list of Olympian victors it would not be possible to find more than two or three who have been successful in manhood as well as in boyhood; for the effect of their training in youth is that they lose their physical vigor in consequence of the forced gymnastic exercises they perform. When our youths have devoted three years from the age of puberty to other studies, it is then proper that the succeeding period of life should be occupied with hard exercises and severities of diet. For the intellect and the body should not be subject to severe exertion simultaneously, as the two kinds of exertion naturally produce contrary effects, that of the body being an impediment to the intellect, and that of the intellect to the body." (B. V. 4.)

(Aristotle then proceeds to discuss the moral effect of different kinds of music, and then seems to get tired of his subject. The whole discussion, though full of good sense, is as a whole inadequate and disappointing.)

But gymnastic, though indispensable, is only, like reading and writing, a preliminary: the true aim of education is the training to do what is virtuous for its own sake and with no ulterior purpose. In this way alone the capable citizen can be produced, and one who will, further, be capable of enjoyment of the noblest kind. This being so, we should read the *ethics* as well as the *politics* if we are to form a true conception of Aristotle's educational ideal. The process of education is, in brief, *instruction and discipline in virtue*. From this point of view the *ethica* is truly A.'s prime educational treatise. What are in the *politics* called the subjects of education are in truth only the indispensable subsidiaries or instruments of the true education, which is ethical in its aim.

Aristotle does not, unfortunately, show us how we are to proceed, nor how best to form the noble character whose employment of leisure is noble.

Plato's aim in education you will have seen is a harmonious man in a harmonious state. This harmonious man is the realization of "the good" in the individual which again is identical with "the just." The individual, however, is only a part of a higher harmony, the harmony which is realized in a *just state*. The individual is thus necessarily subject to the interests of the whole, and must find his particular harmony in and through the larger harmony of which he is merely a part. This Platonic conception is in truth a philosophic rendering and an idealization of the Doric educational idea.

When we compare the Platonic with the Aristotelian educational aim we are struck by the more modern spirit of Aristotle. He does not aim at theoretic completeness in his view of man and the State. He takes things as he finds them and keeps his eye fixed on the possible and practicable. The cultured and harmonious man is not an object of concern with him, but only the capable and virtuous citizen. Virtue, in brief, is Aristotle's educational end—the virtue of the individual without regard to an ideal harmony of nature or perfect culture. Let each man be sound in body and virtuous, and

Aristotle is content. He demands, however, that he be capable also of enjoyment and that he shall enjoy. He is not to be in such deadly earnest about virtue that he has no vital energy left for enjoyment, enjoyments of a liberal and elevating kind. Where there are such men, the State as such may be left out of account (we may almost say, although this is to strain Aristotle):—it will certainly, as a matter of course, be cared for wisely. Now this I consider to be a practical formulation of the Attic spirit as opposed to the Doric. It is in the spirit of Pericles' address to the Athenians in which he insists on the claims of the individual which Plato, on the other hand, would subject entirely (as did the Spartans,) to the claims of the State. Aristotle's doctrine is the doctrine of freedom: Plato's the doctrine of despotism.

Note: The translations are taken from Welldon's *Politics*.

THE TEACHING OF HISTORY

There is a saying attributed to Napoleon, that "History is but a fable agreed upon." This saying illustrates and emphasizes the central fact that history has as its great end the recording of truth. But what truth? All science aims to discover truth; the basis of every art is conformity to truth; the end of every philosophy is presentation of truth. History looks backward. It is past truth, therefore. It looks backward at the story of the world, and seeks to discover and describe it. But the central idea is man. Geology may busy itself with the earth, biology with the evolution of life, history finds its sphere in the story of man, his origin, his development, his activities. It concerns itself with everything with which man has to do, and it discriminates all sciences, arts, and philosophies according to their relations to him. Moreover, it finds its proper expression in prose. The *Iliad* ceases to be history under this statement, but so also do the various metrical chronicles which even at a late day have been the means of transmitting to us the history of our race. They may contain history, but they themselves are not history. They are the sources of history, but their form precludes their being considered as history itself. Though this fits the ideal of dignity, so dear to Gibbon, and the authoritative demand of critics, I set little value upon this